Having spent a career in advertising but a lifetime in love with aviation, I couldn't help but stick my (civvy) oar into your ongoing RAF v Royal Navy spending skirmish. What drew me to the debate was the peculiarly antiquated approach of Nigel MacCartan-Ward (Naval air power offers a far cheaper overseas option than the RAF, 8 April). I may not be as qualified in the subject as the "former naval air warfare adviser to the first sea lord" but neither do I have a job title worthy of Gilbert and Sullivan. I pay tax. I own the kit. I have a say.
For me, the "carrier battle group" is the military equivalent of asking someone to stand still while you amble across the room to hit them. Far from standing still, today's world events appear to be moving at a rate of knots (to coin a phrase). In a world where an internet search for the word "sloth" delivers 8 million results in 0.06 of a second, the taskforce of old suddenly has a whiff of second-class post about it.
Granted, there are French carriers in the Med. And today's hotspot is most certainly Libya. But next week's disaster zone maybe South America, and when last I looked, our current illustrious carriers were at anchor on eBay. Things are happening far too rapidly to ask history to hold its horses for a fortnight while we get there. (Oh, and note to sea lords everywhere, the horses are now Toyota Land Cruisers).
I believe that the RAF I'm currently funding is essentially an extended arm of UK government influence. Be that in conjunction with the Foreign Office, via the rapid delivery of humanitarian aid, rations or shelter, or yes, when necessary, a pinpoint laser-guided intrusion into some unsuspecting bad lad's back bunker. Whatever the circumstance, rapidity of response is the key. In fact, getting there fast enough may even deter military action from taking place at all. Preventing a drama becoming a crisis, as we say in my trade. To most, warships off the coast simply reads as war declared.
I'm well aware that the days of skies full of RAF planes are lost and gone for ever, but that is what makes the present and future choice of type so vital. Choosing to stick with a single attack aircraft in the Tornado GR4 has allowed the RAF to retain the (more than often humanitarian) services of C-17, Hercules and TriStar. As well as cargo and passenger support to Afghanistan. Money well spent, I'd say.
And with the remarkable Harrier confined to history (and/or a shed in Lincolnshire), and its planned successor, the hilariously inappropriately named F35 "Lightning", approaching with all the velocity of a gate guardian at Duxford, Tornado really is the only game in town. Perhaps it's time we recalled its original spec: Tornado began life as MRCA, and it remains a genuinely Multi-Role Combat Aircraft. It does indeed do exactly what it says on the tin. And long may it continue to do so.
What our armed forces deserve from government is decisiveness and vision. What they're currently getting is turbulence and short-sightedness. Not qualities one would normally associate with safe flying. RAF, navy or otherwise.
Trevor Beattie
Partner, BMB
• Nigel MacCartan-Ward presents an outdated argument for the Harrier. Warfare has moved on, and although the tyranny of distance is always a factor, it has been eroded and distance is not a strategic problem for air over Libya. His argument for pushing carrier-borne Harriers forward as the UK's offensive air capability, with all the attendant carrier battle group support, does not recognise what air power – rather than an aircraft – is, what it achieves and where it fits in a campaign such as Operation Unified Protector. The relevance of his argument for "Harrier as the answer" is substantially undone by the facts.
Operating from the home base, with full support, the first Tornado strike mission flown from RAF Marham to Libya on 20 March was launched within 48 hours of the UN security council resolution. These missions have continued and are contributing to the deep effect required. The Tornado GR4's speed, capability and range puts it in a different league to the Harrier – which has no radar, now considered a baseline capability for operations. The weaponry and sensors used so precisely by the RAF's Tornados simply cannot be used by the Harrier. The Tornado does not need to "poise" on the horizon on board a carrier, with all the inherent notice required to pre-position and the need for layered defence. The Tornado GR Force also has years of experience of just this type of deep operations – indeed Tornados were operating in Afghanistan in intelligence gathering and close air support of troops on the ground at the same time.
Carriers are undoubtedly useful, but they don't operate in isolation. Campaign command and control is most effectively run from shore and, in this case, much of the supporting architecture is already in place. Carriers have utility if simpler shore-based options do not exist, but a UK carrier-based capability would not be up to the strength, reach, persistence or effect required. This campaign has to merge the full spectrum of kinetic and non-kinetic air power capabilities to shape the battle space for further exploitation and to help achieve the political requirements for peace thereafter.
So far we've prevented a massacre of rebels in the east of Libya; neutralised a proportion of the regime's command and control and offensive capability; restricted provision of supply and materiel; and paved the way for a political rather than a military solution. But, as Sir Stephen Dalton has said, further progress will take time. Control of the air is a precursor to successful and effective operations in all other environments, is achieved through many different methods, defensive and offensive, kinetic and non-kinetic, and is something that has to be worked for constantly.
Air Commodore Julian Stinton (Ret'd)
Shaftesbury, Dorset
• As the government has decommissioned HMS Ark Royal and is threatening to render a number of personnel redundant in all three armed services, I was surprised to find the Royal Navy setting up a mobile information/recruitment stand in Birmingham on Monday. Could this be a cynical way of reducing costs by getting rid of highly skilled and expensive senior personnel and replacing them with recruits on much lower pay scales?
John Smith
Birmingham