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UK military action abroad will always be best served by aircraft carrier battle groups not land-based air forces
The remarks by Sir Stephen Dalton (Expensive? It's relative. What are the consequences of a lack of air power?, 4 April) must be seen as something of a Freudian slip. He warns paymasters that the RAF's core capabilities remain "essential for almost all types of operations and warfare". But these RAF core capabilities are simply aircraft – nothing more, nothing less.
"Air power" does require aircraft but it is not the prerogative of land-based air forces that cannot, without massive expense, project military influence to all corners of the globe. This capability is vested in the Royal Navy and its aircraft carriers which have cost-effectively carried out this task for the last 100 years – with very little help from land-based air forces. As the former naval air warfare adviser to the first sea lord, I feel well qualified to comment.
Dalton says: "Many people may think that we have not been loud enough in making the case for air power." But this is disingenuous. The RAF has been trumpeting its single service cause for decades but it has diligently opposed the provision of resources for naval air power. The recent strategic defence and security review decision to do without the availability of aircraft carriers is clear evidence of this and was contrived by them.
Perversely, he emphasises the importance of "maintaining the key, core, capabilities" and states that "if you get rid of those core capabilities it's much more difficult to regenerate". Presumably Dalton is criticising the government decision to get rid of aircraft carriers and naval air warfare expertise for the next 10 years.
Surprisingly, he goes on to emphasise the cost of air power: "The costs are often hidden and don't become apparent until much, much later." Where then has the taxpayers' money been spent? Since 1979, RAF land-based air power had cost the nation £10.74bn per year (inflation-linked) – for the most part, sitting at home; aircraft carrier air power has cost the nation just £526m per year for "doing things around the globe". And as Dalton well knows, successful combat and operational utility has been inversely proportional to these widely differing costs.
In his final comment – "the immediate priority is Libya" – he unwittingly draws attention to the major land-based air costs associated with operation Odyssey Dawn. Operational costs for the first eight days were: Royal Air Force operations – Tornado and Storm Shadow, £41,450,000; Royal Navy operations – Tomahawk and on-site deterrence, £4,564,000.
If RAF operations are to continue for six months (and this will include phased replacement of personnel and aircraft costs, major logistical support and accommodation costs in Italy, etc), this could result in a bill of approximately £1bn – as opposed to doing the job the sensible navy way with HMS Ark Royal and/or Illustrious and Harriers at a cost of just £103m. Extraordinary costs, indeed, which could have been avoided had HMS Ark Royal been retained in service. Perhaps what Dalton was really trying to say was: "Keep our carrier battle group capability and save an awful lot of money!"
